We thank the Accounting and Finance division at the University of Stirling, Damietta University and the Ministry of higher education in Egypt for funding this study. We also gratefully acknowledge helpful comments received from two anonymous reviewers, Basil Al-Najjar, Dionysia Dionysiou, Ian Fraser, Alan Goodacre, Patrick Herbst, Brian Singleton-Green, Richard Slack, the participants of the 16 th FRBC Conference (Bristol, July 2012), of the research seminar at the Accounting and Finance division at the University of Stirling consists of 448 firm-year observations. We first develop a measure for the quality of the KPI disclosure based on the ASB's guidelines. We then test the economic consequences of financial and nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality both separately and combined into one variable. Our findings, after conducting various sensitivity tests, suggest that only the disclosure quality of financial KPIs matters. We find a significantly negative (weakly positive) relationship between disclosure quality of financial KPIs and the implied cost of capital (firm value). These results inform regulatory bodies as well as the academic literature about the potential economic consequences of this type of disclosure.
Introduction
The UK Companies Act (CA) of 2006 defines key performance indicators (KPIs) as the 'factors by reference to which the development, performance or position of the business of the company can be measured effectively' (UK Companies Act (CA), 2006: 196) . The reporting of KPIs should be valuable for investors because they contain information related to important aspects of companies' activities which might not be clearly reflected in the financial statements (ACIFR, 2008) . Therefore, KPIs disclosure is crucial in supporting companies' communication with stakeholders in order to enable a better understanding of financial statements and the companies' progress towards the achievement of their objectives and targets (Accounting Standard Board (ASB), 2006). Many regulatory bodies suggest or require companies to disclose KPIs within their annual reports (e.g., EU Accounts Modernisation Directive, 2003; IASB, 2010; and SEC, 2003) . 1 In the UK in particular, section 417 of the CA (2006) introduced the requirement for companies (except the small ones) to analyse their performance by using KPIs in their Business Review. 2 These could be financial or, 'if appropriate', nonfinancial. The latter could include environmental and employee matters (CA, 2006) . Furthermore, in January 2006, the ASB issued the reporting statement 'Operating and Financial Review' (OFR) which contains guidelines for the best practices regarding KPI disclosure.
However, the nature of these requirements allows companies' directors to exercise discretion on the reporting of KPIs: a) they can determine the extent necessary for financial and nonfinancial KPIs for an understanding of the development, performance, or position of the company; b) they can determine what is appropriate when reporting nonfinancial KPIs; and c) they can take advantage of the exemption provisions (10, 11 section 417 of CA, 2006) for not providing KPIs information because of confidentiality reasons. Therefore, the quality and quantity of KPI reporting should vary among UK companies. However, many reports (e.g., FRC, 2007; ) and regulatory bodies (IASB, 2010; SEC, 2003) highlight that quality is the crucial issue in KPIs reporting and raise concerns about the usefulness of quantity of information regarding KPIs.
Despite these concerns, we identify only a research monograph which investigates the quantity or the quality of KPI reporting for a small sample of UK listed companies. 3 Further, we know of no study which examines the economic consequences of these disclosures in the UK. 4 Considering this gap in the literature, we first develop a research instrument to measure the quality of the KPIs disclosure. This instrument considers the qualitative attributes of KPIs information as suggested by the OFR (ASB, 2006) which are expected to be fulfilled by companies' corresponding disclosure.
Subsequently, we manually collect our data from the annual reports of a randomly selected sample of UK nonfinancial firms which were constituents of the FTSE 350 for the five-year period of 2006 to 2010 that results in 448 observations. Once we calculate KPIs disclosure scores, we conduct univariate and multivariate analyses to explore their relationship with companies' implied cost of capital (ICC) and their value relevance.
We find high variations in KPIs reporting practice across the sample firms with a clear tendency to focus on financial KPIs. Although the quality of KPIs disclosure increases over time, the mean quality scores are relatively low (below 50% for both financial and nonfinancial KPIs). These low scores indicate that although the companies do disclose some information about financial and nonfinancial KPIs, they fail to follow the ASB's (2006) guidelines for best practice. Our empirical results show that the quality of financial KPI disclosures is negatively related with companies' ICCs and has a weakly positive relationship with their market values. Additional tests also show that the quantity of KPIs reporting results in no economic consequences, which confirms the regulatory bodies' recommendations that the quality of KPI reporting is of great importance.
3 Tauringana and Mangena (2009) investigate the reporting of KPIs by 32 UK media sector companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 2004 to 2007. 4 In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the only study focusing on KPIs reporting being relevant to this one, to some extent, is the study by Dorestani and Rezaee (2011) . The authors examine the association between non-financial KPIs disclosures and the accuracy of analysts' forecasts for a sample of US firms for the two-year period 2006 and 2007.
Based on these findings, our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we develop a context-specific measure of the quality of KPIs reporting. As highlighted by Leuz and Wysocki (2008) , there is a lack of a measure which combines all of the desirable properties for disclosure. The approach we follow could be beneficial for future studies dealing with disclosures in order to avoid proxy-selection biases. Second, we add empirical evidence about the economic consequences of the quality of the KPIs disclosure. We find that the more companies disclose financial KPIs that follow the ASB's (2006) guidelines, the more they benefit from a reduction in their cost of capital and an increase in their market value. These results suggest that KPIs related information in companies'
annual reports is fed into the companies' cost of capital and market valuation, indicating that the requirement for companies to disclose KPIs contains value relevant information for financial statements users. This should be of interest to companies as well as regulators. Additionally, our findings of very low quality levels for KPIs disclosure indicate that many UK firms do not follow the ASB's corresponding guidelines and this should have an appeal to regulators. Arguably, more consultation with preparers and users on how the principles to be followed could add value by improving the quality of the information disclosed. Finally, this study has policy implications beyond the EU and the UK in particular. It is also relevant in the US since the SEC has introduced the requirement for companies to publish KPIs since 2003 and research regarding the economic consequences of such reporting is absent.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 draws on the relevant regulatory framework and has a review of the relevant literature. In this section, we also develop the hypotheses tested. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, and Section 5 discusses the results from the sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.
Regulatory Framework and Hypotheses Development

Regulatory framework
To highlight the increasing trend of requiring KPIs reporting across the world and in the UK in (FRC, 2009: 27) . Therefore, similar to the earlier report, the FRC (2009) has focused on best practices for KPIs reporting in terms of quality and has stated that quality can be achieved when 'each KPI disclosure includes definition, purpose, comparatives, commentary on targets, etc.' (FRC, 2009: 26) . This report does not contain a list of KPIs to be disclosed, but preparers are advised to report only those KPIs which are clearly relevant to the business. The findings of both reports and the guidelines from the ASB (2006) and DEFRA (2006; indicate that what matters in KPIs reporting is quality and not quantity. The same conclusion appears to be the focus for the SEC (2003) and the IASB (2010) guidelines given that they both suggest that the KPIs reported should be accompanied by information which enhances their understanding and why they are relevant.
The focus on KPIs reporting quality is understandable, if one considers that information conveyed through this type of disclosure is not standardised (as it would be if mandated by accounting standards for example). Thus, a clear indication of the KPIs' qualitative characteristics (e.g., definition, calculation method, purpose for disclosing, and motivation of why the disclosure should be useful to users of the annual report) is essential for the understanding of the nature of a firm's business and value creation model. These characteristics are included in those highlighted by the ASB (2006) . Considering the definition of KPIs in the CA (2006) and the important expectations about the usefulness and relevance of this type of disclosure, we develop a measure which captures the KPIs disclosure quality and investigate their economic consequences. We examine the relationship of KPIs reporting quality with the cost of capital and market value of UK firms.
Hypotheses Development
Given that KPIs reporting intends to provide investors with a better understanding of the data contained in financial statements and is available to the insiders (CA, 2006; FRC, 2007; IASB, 2010; SEC, 2003) , KPIs disclosure should mitigate problems from information asymmetry. Financial and nonfinancial KPIs should reduce the uncertainty with regard to business performance, therefore helping investors to make a better valuation of a company. In such contexts, the disclosure literature argues that corporate disclosure is able to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009 ). Thus, enhanced disclosure might lead to an increase in the demand for a company's share and in turn the share's price (Clarkson et al., 1996; Hassan et al., 2009) because the disclosure should correct any firm misevaluation (Healy et al., 1999) . A rich information environment could lead to desirable economic consequences such as a reduction in the firm's cost of equity capital (Beyer et al., 2010; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) and an increase in the firm's value (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) .
The disclosure literature offers two theoretical frameworks to support the proposition that greater corporate disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. The first suggests that disclosure reduces adverse selection and, as a result, increases liquidity. As discussed above, greater disclosure reduces the possibility of information asymmetries. This, in turn, enhances stock liquidity and reduces the cost of capital by reducing the discount at which shares are sold through reduced transaction costs or by increasing the demand for a firm's securities (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O'Hara, 2004) . The second framework suggests that increased disclosure reduces the estimation risk in two ways: first, securities with more information are less risky because of lower uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distribution (e.g., Clarkson et al., 1996; Easley and O'Hara, 2004) ; and, second, the covariance of a firm's cash flow with the cash flow of other firms decreases as disclosures increase (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007) . Thus, enhanced corporate disclosure directly reduces estimation risk that leads to an indirect reduction in the firm's cost of capital.
The latter framework is also useful in examining the link between corporate disclosure and firm value. In addition to the direct effects on the covariance of a firm's cash flow, corporate disclosures have the potential to change the firm value by affecting managers' decisions and hence altering the distribution of future cash flows (Lambert et al., 2007) . Thus, there might be indirect effects on the firm value through cash flow expectations formed on the basis of enhanced corporate disclosure.
Based on these findings, improved corporate disclosure should reduce the cost of capital and increase the market value at the same time. However, the firm value might change even if the cost of capital does not. This change in value happens when cash flow expectations do not change proportionally to covariance estimates (Pope and McLeay, 2011) . Thus, in exploring the economic consequences of KPIs reporting, we focus both the cost of capital and the firm value.
The empirical evidence for the effect of disclosure on companies' cost of capital and their market value is mixed (Beyer et al., 2010; Kothari et al., 2009; Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). For example, some studies report a negative association between disclosure levels and firms' cost of equity capital (e.g., Botosan 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2002) . However, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find a negative (positive) association between annual report disclosures (quarterly report disclosures) and the cost of capital.
Similarly, the empirical literature examining the link between corporate disclosure and firm value also offers mixed results. For example, a number of studies report a positive association between these two variables (e.g. Baek et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2010; Jiao, 2011) . However, Hassan et al.
(2009) find that there is no significant association between firm value and voluntary disclosure, while there is a negative and significant relation with mandatory disclosure when the relation of their relationship with market value is tested simultaneously. Finally, Uyar and Kiliç (2012) find that the association between voluntary disclosure and firm value varies depending on the proxy used for firm value. Beattie et al. (2004) suggest that the mixed evidence on the economic consequences of enhanced disclosure might be due to an insufficient degree of accuracy in measuring the primary variable of interest (i.e., disclosure). Along these lines, Leuz and Wysocki (2008) 
Research design
Measurement of KPIs disclosure quality
To derive our measure of KPIs disclosure quality, we draw on the OFR (2006) guidelines. These describe the key qualitative characteristics of each KPI (see Appendix A for a full list of the characteristics). We consider that if KPIs disclosure meet these characteristics, then the reporting should be of high quality. The following example is indicative of the usefulness of our measure.
Drawing on the annual report published by Qinetic Group PLC in 2007, we find seven financial and two nonfinancial KPIs: proportion of revenue generated in North America; book to bill ratio; backlog; underlying earnings per share growth; total shareholder return; operating cash conversion; underlying operating profit margin; health and safety of employees; and staff attrition rate. While the meaning and usefulness of some of the above KPIs is easily understandable because of their link to information related to the financial statements, a broad discussion is needed in order to achieve a full comprehension of the information that some of these KPIs convey, including why they are considered relevant to the shareholders (e.g., book to bill ratio; backlog, staff attrition rate). In line with the FRC (2009), disclosing the information suggested by the guidelines should indicate the quality of the KPI reporting. Thus, our measure considers the content of the KPI disclosure that should enhance the understanding of the discussion and analysis.
Based on this, a dichotomous scoring approach is applied by manually capturing each KPI's disclosure quality. If a required quality dimension is met, it is scored as one, otherwise it is scored as zero. If a quality dimension is not applicable to a specific KPI, then it is scored as 'not applicable' (NA) (e.g. Cooke, 1992). 8 Following this procedure, the quality score for each KPI is calculated as a ratio of the total quality dimensions at the maximum quality score achievable for that specific KPI (time subscripts omitted):
where , is the total number of quality dimensions ( , 0 ≤ ≤ ) observed for KPI k by firm , and , is the maximum number of applicable quality dimensions ( , 0 ≤ ≤ , ≥ ) for KPI k by firm j.
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Once each KPI's disclosure quality is measured, we estimate each firm-year observation's overall KPI disclosure quality. This is derived as the mean of the KPI quality scores. Thus, KPIs disclosure quality for each firm is weighted by the number (i.e., quantity) of KPIs reported. This weight is presented as follows (time subscripts omitted):
where is the KPI quality score for firm j, lying between zero and one; , is each KPI quality score measured according to Eq. (1); and , is the number of KPIs disclosed by firm j. When no KPI is disclosed, is equal to zero. This value means that firm j conveys no relevant information with regard to any of the qualitative characteristics in the OFR.
We apply this method to derive six scores of KPIs disclosure quality: the overall quality scores disclosed in the annual report (OvKPIsRep) or just in the Business Review (OvKPIsSec); the scores related to the financial KPIs only disclosed in the annual report (FKPIsRep) or just in the Business Review (FKPIsSec); the scores related to the nonfinancial KPIs only disclosed in the annual report (NonFKPIsRep) or just in the Business Review (NonFKPIsSec). Appendix B provides an example of how we compute overall quantity and quality of KPIs reporting as well as for financial and nonfinancial KPIs separately.
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We do not use the actual QlAvKPIs scores in the multivariate analysis. We employ the following transformations instead. First, we calculate the percentile rank (QlAvKPIs_rank) (e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; Nikolaev and Van Lent, 2005) by using the dense rankings in the following equation:
10 Before scoring all of our sample firms, we conduct a pilot study on a randomly selected sample of ten annual reports to address the validity and reliability of our instrument (cf., Tsalavoutas et al., 2010) . We first develop decision rules, and these are used as a reference while coding. Furthermore, each researcher independently codes the annual reports of the pilot study sample to ensure consistency in applying these rules. Additionally, we perform nonparametric tests (KruskalWallis) to compare the quality scores we coded separately. These indicate that there is no significant difference between the median scores among us, verifying the reliability of our research instrument (results are available upon request). While following this process we noticed that companies do not disclose KPIs only in the Business Review as suggested by the CA (2006), but also in other areas of the annual report.
where _ , is the percentile rank of firm j during year t, , is the rank/position of firm j during year t , and is the sample size less the number of ties for year t. The KPIs disclosure quality is ranked in ascending order, so that the newly created variable increases with the KPIs disclosure quality (see, e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; Hail, 2002) and this variable lies between zero and one. 11 Thus, according to our hypotheses, the higher (lower) the KPIs disclosure quality, then the lower (higher) the cost of capital and the higher (lower) the KPIs disclosure quality's value relevance.
Second, we also consider the normal scores (QlAvKPIs_norm) as an alternative transformation (Cooke, 1998). We calculate QlAvKPIs_norm by using the following equation:
where _ , is the normal score of firm j during year t, and −1 (•) is the inverse of the cumulative density normal function.
Cost of equity measurement
Early studies on estimating cost of equity capital relied on ex-post realised returns to measure the exante expected returns. However, subsequent studies demonstrate that realised returns are a noisy proxy for expected returns (e.g., Fama and French, 2002) . Among all of the possibilities, we focus on the implied cost of equity capital (hereafter, ICC) that does not rely on biased realised returns or on asset pricing models (Hou et al., 2012 ) because its reasoning is based on a variation of the EdwardsBell-Ohlson accounting model (Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995) .
During the last decade, many ICC models have been developed and compared in the literature.
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) Moreover, as highlighted in Mazzi et al. (2014) , the above said comparisons are based on US data and they sometimes rely on US databases (e.g. Value Line). The EU analyses commonly use data available in I/B/E/S (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; Li, 2010) and are therefore not able to estimate some ICC measures compared in the previous cited studies (e.g., ). As a result, in order to avoid or mitigate some biases highlighted in the literature, many empirical studies have used an average of various ICC models (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Hail and Leuz, 2006) . Similarly, we use the average of four different measures of the ICC (hereafter ), which are the models used by Claus and Thomas . An indirect advantage of using is that it allows us to discard as few as possible observations from our sample due to data unavailability. 
Multivariate analyses
To test our first set of hypotheses (H1, H1.a and H1.b), we proceed as follows. We consider that the ICC is a function of KPIs disclosure quality and other control factors suggested by prior empirical literature. The latter include risk, growth, and size (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010) . Thus, we estimate the following regression model:
where is the implied cost of capital based on the mean of the four estimated ICC measures described above. The controls are the M2B (market value (WC08001) to book value of equity (WC03501)), SalG (percentage change in sales (WC01001)), AWCA (absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by total assets, according to Marra et al., 2011) , 13 rVar (return variance over the financial year, ( −11 / 0 )); Dispersion (EPS forecasts standard deviation, STDEV in I/B/E/S),
and AnFollow (the number of analysts following the firm, NUMEST in I/B/E/S).
To test our second set of hypotheses (i.e., H2, H2.a and H2.b), we use Ohlson's (1995) model as a framework which combines accounting and non-accounting data. This method allows us to treat the KPIs disclosure quality as 'other information' available to the market participants. Consistent with this approach, we estimate the following regression model:
where MV is the market value of equity (WC08001), BV is the book value of equity (WC03501), and NI is the net income (WC01751). All of these variables are scaled by the number of shares outstanding (NOSH) (Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2008) .
In order to test our ancillary hypotheses, we run the same tests for the overall KPIs quality (OvKPIsRep) for financial and nonfinancial KPIs quality separately (FKPIsRep and NonFKPIsRep) and based on whether these are reported in the whole annual report or in the Business Review (OvKPIsSec, FKPIsSec, and NonFKPIsSec). To ensure the robustness of our tests, regressions (5) and (6) are estimated using both the KPIs' quality transformations (i.e., percentile dense rankings (QlAvKPIs_rank) and normal scores (QlAvKPIs_norm)).
Additionally, in estimating the regression models, we control for the cross-sectional correlations
, where is non-cash working capital accruals computed as
. and TA stand for sales and total assets (WC01001 and WC02999 respectively).
by using cluster-two by firm and year (see Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) . Further, multicollinearity is checked with a variance inflation factor (VIF).
Finally, in order to address any concerns of endogeneity between KPIs disclosure quality and ICC, we also estimate 2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS specification, KPIs disclosure quality is treated as endogenous and the following variables are used as instruments in the first stage: Liquidity (current assets (WC02201) to current liabilities (WC03101)), Leverage (debt (WC03051) to book value of equity (WC03501)), BoardSize (total number of directors on the board; hand collected), RoleDuality (dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman is the same person as the CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise; hand collected), ACmeetings (total number of audit committee meetings during the year; hand collected), CrossListing (dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's shares are traded in foreign financial markets, 0 otherwise), and Industry fixed effects. Second stage is equal to equation (5). We then perform the Hausman test which is the most commonly used test providing a formal test on whether the instrumental variables estimator is significantly different from the OLS estimator (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) . If the X 2 in the Hausman test is significant, the 2SLS estimators are better than OLS and vice versa.
Sample selection process and data
We examine a panel data set of UK firms over the five-year period from 2006 to 2010. We start with the 2011 Financial Times ranking to identify the top 350 UK firms based on market value.
14 Following the literature (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) , we then exclude financial firms, given their specific characteristics and the different framework for disclosure practices applicable to them. Subsequently, we randomly select firms so that each industry is represented by the same proportion as in the initial sample. In order to do this selection, we rank all of the firms in each industry by their market capitalisation, and we use systematic sampling by 14 The vast majority of the annual reports for 2010 were issued during 2011. We consider the 2011 Financial Times ranking so as to allow information contained in the annual reports for 2010 to be priced by the market, capturing the relative size of our sample firms.
retaining the first firm in every industry as a starting point, then the third, the fifth, and so on.
Following this procedure, we identify 102 firms (510 firm-year observations over the five-year period of 2006 to 2010). In a subsequent sampling step, we exclude various observations given data unavailability and other constraints. Panel A in Table 1 provides more details on the process applied in selecting our final sample (448 observations). In addition, Panel B provides a disaggregation of our sample across industries.
TABLE 1 -ABOUT HERE
We download annual reports from the companies' webpages or the Thomson One Banker database.
We also download firms' fundamental characteristics from Datastream, analysts' forecasts from
Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), and inflation rates forecasts from the Bank of England.
Findings
Descriptive statistics
We report the descriptive statistics for each control variable in Table 2 . 15 Data are presented before any procedure that accounts for the presence of outliers -see below. The mean (median) MV of the sample is £7.5 (1.2) bn, while the standard deviation is £17.3 bn. This high variation is expected given that our sample firms are drawn from the FTSE 350 which includes the largest and most liquid shares in the UK. The mean (median) market to book value (M2B) is 4.5 (2.7) which suggests that financial markets believe that a considerable part of a firm's value is not represented by its book value of equity. The mean (median) number of analysts following (AnFollow) is 14 (13), with a standard deviation of 7. Because we focus on disclosure, the ICC and the firm value, having a relative large number of analysts following each firm is desirable for two reasons: first, it confers robustness to our ICC measures because we have more forecasts to rely on when estimating the ICC; and second, it 15 The NOSH and Sal are not used as control variables. The former is used for scaling the variables in Eq. 6 and the latter for the calculation of the independent variables. We provide information about these for the interest of the reader.
enhances the potential effect of the disclosure on the ICC and the firm value because there are more sophisticated investors who probably pay attention to that disclosure.
We note that these descriptive statistics show large differences between the mean and median values for variables. Untabulated results show that the distribution of NI is negatively skewed, while the distribution of all other variables is positively skewed. Thus, we proceed by winsorising the independent variables which are not log-transformed at the 2 nd and 98 th percentiles to account for influential/outlying observations. After this procedure, untabulated results show that the distribution of our variables is less skewed. For example, the highest skewness before applying the winsorising procedure is exposed by M2B and Dispersion (11.735 and 11.087 respectively). After winsorising our data, these variables expose significantly lower skewness (3.428 and 2.427 respectively). Hence, we use the winsorised data in our empirical analyses. Table 3 shows the levels of KPI disclosure quality with regard to what is disclosed in the whole annual report. These levels show that the mean (median) quality of the total KPIs disclosed in companies' Similar results occur when exploring the quality levels of the disclosures of the financial and nonfinancial KPIs separately. When comparing the two sets of KPIs, we notice that the quality of nonfinancial KPIs disclosure tends to be lower than that of the financial KPIs. With regard to the period covered, the mean (median) for the former is 33% (36%) and the corresponding for the latter is 36% (38%). The T-test (Wilcoxon test) confirms that there is a statistically significant difference at the 1% level (10% level) between the disclosure qualities of financial and nonfinancial KPIs.
TABLE 2 -ABOUT HERE
In Panel C of Table 3 , we disaggregate our sample firms across quality score groups. The information in this panel shows that only a few companies report overall KPIs disclosure with qualities higher than 60%, and no company is identified with a KPI disclosure quality above 90%.
This result is mainly driven by the high quality of the financial KPIs reporting. Furthermore, we observe that there is at least one company in each year whose KPIs quality score is zero which means that it did not disclose any KPI or it disclosed some, but without reporting any of the qualitative characteristics suggested by ASB (2006).
TABLE 3 -ABOUT HERE
Given that our KPIs quality measure relies also on quantity, our untabulated results indicate that the mean (median) number of total KPIs disclosed in companies' annual reports increases Table 4 shows the quality levels of the KPI disclosures with regard to what is disclosed in the Business Review only. As reported in Table 3 , Table 4 shows that the mean (median) quality of total KPIs disclosed in the Business Review increases significantly (p<0.01 based on the Cuzick (1985) test) across the sample period (from 28% (29%) in 2006 to 43% (44%) in 2010). As with the results in Table 3 , this trend is driven by an increase in the KPIs disclosure quality from 2006 to 2008. The mean (median) quality of the total KPIs disclosed throughout the sample period is 37% (39%). As these figures are lower than the corresponding ones with regard to the information disclosed throughout the whole annual report, they indicate that it is the quality of information disclosed in the 16 Tables reporting the relevant information discussed here are available on request.
Business Review that drives the quality of information disclosed in the annual report downwards.
Confirming the previous results from Table 3 , we notice that the quality of the nonfinancial KPIs disclosure is lower than that of financial KPIs. The mean (median) for the former is 28% (29%) and the corresponding for the latter is 37% (39%). The T-test (Wilcoxon test) confirms that there is a statistically significant difference at the 1% level (1% level) between our two sets of KPIs. (2 (1)) is lower than the corresponding number in the annual report (3 (2)) which means that this type of information is preferably conveyed in a different part of the annual report. Table 5 reports more detailed information on the KPIs disclosed and on their disclosure quality.
Panel A shows that eight out of the ten most commonly reported KPIs are financial, while only two are nonfinancial (i.e., employees accidents, ranked 6 th , and lost time incidents, ranked 9 th ). The most commonly reported KPIs are related to earnings per share; in 58% of our sample firms, a relevant KPI is reported. KPIs related to cash flows and revenues are also frequently reported across our sample firms (57% and 53% respectively). The ten most common financial KPIs disclosed relate to information that could be obtained from the income statement (e.g., revenues and margins) and from the cash flow statement (e.g., dividends and capital expenditure). Our sample companies report these KPIs in their annual reports very frequently, varying from a maximum frequency of 58% to a minimum frequency of 13%. The ten most common nonfinancial KPIs relate mostly to employees 17 Tables reporting the relevant information discussed here are available upon request.
and environmental issues. However, we observe that this type of KPIs are more tailored to the nature of business of each individual firm, resulting in a much lower repetition of identical KPIs across many firms. More specifically, the frequencies of the ten most common nonfinancial KPIs vary from a maximum of 20% to a minimum of 2%.
Panel B reports descriptive statistics on the qualitative characteristics suggested by the OFR (2006). We identified that our sample companies disclosed 3,842 different KPIs (2,422 financial; 1,420 nonfinancial) throughout the whole period. The most commonly fulfilled characteristics are definition of the KPIs (98%) and the comparison with the corresponding amount for the financial year immediately preceding the current one (90%). One of the lowest disclosed qualitative characteristics is the source of the underlying data used for the calculation of a KPI (37%).
Overall, these descriptive statistics indicate that companies are not forthcoming in relation to certain types of KPI, especially those that relate to future related information. This is in line with the general narrative reporting literature in which there is consensus that companies are more forthcoming about past information than they are about future related information and that qualitative information dominates quantitative information. Litigation, proprietary cost issues, reputation and self-serving bias may be reasons for such disclosure behaviour. At the same time, these descriptive statistics indicate a wide variation on the information disclosed across companies. Such a variation may feed into companies' level of cost of equity capital and valuation. 
TABLE 5 -ABOUT HERE
Bivariate analysis
The Pearson's correlation coefficients between all of the variables are presented in Table 7 . This shows that all of the proxies we use to capture the quality of the KPI disclosures correlate very positively and significantly (p<0.01). Regarding our first hypothesis (H1), the preliminary evidence is a negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) correlation between the ICC and the overall KPI disclosure quality. When looking at the disclosure quality of financial (H1.a) and nonfinancial KPIs Table 8 ).
The above findings lead us to conclude that the more companies follow the ASB (2006) guidelines for achieving best practice with regard to financial KPIs disclosure quality, the more they benefit with regard to their ICC. The same does not apply to nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality. In fact, our results show that this type of information does not affect the cost of equity capital. Table 9 reports the results regarding our second set of hypotheses. As in the case with regard to the tests relating to the ICC, the aggregate measure for the quality of KPI disclosure is not correlated significantly with the market value (MV). This result also holds irrespective of whether the overall KPI disclosure quality has been captured in the Business Review or the annual report as a whole.
TABLE 8 -ABOUT HERE
However, when looking at the disaggregated effect of the disclosure quality of the financial and nonfinancial KPIs on the market value, we again note that only the financial KPI disclosure quality has a positive and significant coefficient. The results hold irrespective of the transformation applied for the quality score and whether the quality score relates to the KPIs disclosed in the annual report as a whole (1.348, p<0.05, for dense rankings; 0.320, p<0.10, for normal scores) or in the Business per share compared to the firm with the lowest quality of Financial KPIs reporting in our sample.
TABLE 9 -ABOUT HERE
The results reported for financial KPIs confirm the hypothesised economic consequence of disclosure. On the one hand, the literature suggests that corporate disclosure should reduce the cost of capital by enhancing the market liquidity (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O'Hara, 2004) or reducing the estimation risk (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007) . On the other hand, corporate disclosure is able to affect managers' decisions, thus altering the distribution of future cash flows, which indirectly affects firm value (Lambert et al., 2007) . In line with this literature, our results show that financial KPI disclosure quality reduces the cost of capital and is somewhat value relevant, meaning that this specific type of information is useful to investors and is able to reduce information asymmetries. Additionally, our results complement those of Iatridis (2008; who finds that UK firms having higher needs for capital provide disclosures of higher quality, suggesting that UK firms which make additional effort to provide disclosures of better quality achieving a reduction in their cost of capital. The fact that the significance of the two relations is different (strong for the ICC and weak for the firm value) is supported by the literature on the independent movements of the cost of capital and the firm value because of corporate disclosure (Pope and McLeay, 2011) .
Finally, we note that, as shown in Table 5 (Panel A), most of the financial KPIs reported relate to earnings, cash flows and rates of return. Thus, the results in Tables 8 and 9 regarding the relationship between quality of financial KPIs disclosure quality are in line with prior literature showing that earnings related information is value relevant for investors (e.g., Athanasoukou and Hussainey, 2014; Hussainey et al., 2003; Wang and Hussainey, 2013) .
The results for nonfinancial KPIs can be interpreted in light of the CA (2006), which points out that these should only be disclosed 'when appropriate', thus being a sort of secondary source of information. Hence, managers are probably either ineffective at disclosing nonfinancial KPIs which are informative to investors or are reporting useful information but without a quality level which is sufficient for investors to get useful information. The latter is supported by the descriptive statistics in Tables 3 and 4 where we show that, on average, financial KPI disclosure quality is significantly higher than nonfinancial KPIs. Moreover, nonfinancial KPIs are extremely firm specific as we show in Table 5 , where we document a very low percentage of frequency for the 10 most commonly nonfinancial KPIs reported. This variance in reporting of this type of information may result in investors to be provided with less comparable information compared to financial KPIs. Alternatively, such non-financial information might not be viewed as useful by investors anyway. All these might be the reasons for nonfinancial KPIs being value irrelevant.
Overall, we conclude that the more companies follow the ASB (2006) guidelines for achieving best practice with regard to financial KPIs disclosure quality, the more they benefit in terms of the cost of capital and their market value.
Sensitivity analyses and additional tests 18
First, given the debate surrounding the validity of ICC measures, we rerun our regressions that identify the link between KPI disclosure quality and the cost of capital by using a single measure for the ICC. In particular, we use the (Easton, 2004) , since previous studies suggest that is best for ICC measures employing analyst forecasts (Botosan et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2013) . Using this measure reduces our sample from 448 to 415 firm-year observations because of the difficulty in solving the equation with the . The results are the same as in the previous section: overall KPIs' disclosure quality is again not significantly correlated with ICC (negative sign of the coefficient). The financial KPI disclosure quality holds irrespective of the transformation applied for the quality scores 18 Tables reporting the relevant information discussed in this section are available on request.
and whether these are related to the KPIs disclosed in the annual report as a whole (-0.027, p<0. Third, we reflect on our measure for the KPIs disclosure quality and we explore an alternative approach. We create a new measure for KPIs disclosure quality, which is inspired by the Saidin Index (Hodgdon et al., 2008 ) and does weight not equally the quality of each KPI. This new measure is a weighted average where the weights are calculated by considering the number of times a KPIs has been disclosed in a specific year in our sample. The weight applied to each KPI is calculated as the ratio between the times that k-th KPI was disclosed (numerator) on the number of KPIs disclosed for the full sample in a given year (denominator). Untubulated descriptive statistics as well as T-tests (Mann-Whitney tests) confirm that the means (medians) of our new measure for Overall and Financial KPIs disclosure quality are significantly different (p<0.05) from the ones we employ in the results discussed in the previous section. Subsequently, we employ our new measure in multivariate analyses. In order to be consistent with our main tests, we also transformed it employing percentile rankings and normal scores. Our new tests reveal a negative and significant relationship between the weighted index and ICC (p<0.05) compared to insignificant relationship reported in the previous section. These results can be explained based on the rationale we use in developing our new measure for KPIs disclosure quality. Our new measure weights KPIs according to their 'popularity'. Given that financial KPIs are more 'popular' than nonfinancial KPIs, the new measure for the overall quality of KPIs is more influenced by financial than by nonfinancial KPIs. In fact, when exploring the relationship between the disclosure quality of financial KPIs and ICC, results employing our new weighted measure are consistent with those reported in the main tests presented earlier. We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between our weighted measure and ICC (p<0.05).
Finally, the results with regard to the second hypothesis become weaker, as we find no significant relation between our weighted measure and market values Fourth, we also analyse the link between the KPI disclosure quantity and the ICC, as well as its value relevance. When performing these tests, beyond using dense rankings and normal scores, we use two additional transformations: the square root and the log-transformation. These two result in loosing many observations when either the number of financial or nonfinancial KPIs disclosed as zero. The results show that none of the KPI disclosure quantity dimensions (overall, financial, and nonfinancial) is related to the cost of capital or is value relevant. These results are consistent with the FRC (2007, 2009) reports which draw attention to the quality rather than the quantity of KPI reporting. In fact, reporting a large number of KPIs does not appear to reduce information asymmetries. The disclosure of KPIs without directors defining, explaining, and linking each KPI to the financial or nonfinancial performance of the company results in the provision of uninterpretable information, which does not have an impact on the cost of equity capital and the market value.
Conclusions
We contribute to the disclosure literature by being the first study to measure the quality of KPI reporting in companies' annual reports and examining its economic consequences. In particular, we analyse the impact of KPI disclosure quality on firms' cost of capital and firm value. In order to measure the quality of corporate disclosure, we use a manual content analysis that considers all of the qualitative attributes of the information suggested by the ASB (2006) Although a substantial body of literature exists on the economic consequences of disclosure in general, very little is known about the role of KPI reporting which is brought forward by regulators.
Our findings indicate that only the disclosure quality of financial KPIs has a strong negative impact on the ICC and a weak positive relation with firm value. In fact, the quantity of KPI reporting has no effect on the cost of capital or the market value.
Policy makers can take some comfort from the evidence that the KPIs reporting on financial KPIs does have an influence, but they might also be interested in exploring why the quality of nonfinancial KPIs is relatively low and does not result in any economic consequences. Our study should also be relevant to compilers of annual reports because firms' good disclosure practices on financial KPIs lead to a reduction in the ICC and to higher market value, while just disclosing high numbers of KPIs does not result in any benefit.
This study is subject to limitations. Although the measures of the ICC that we use are those most commonly used in the literature, there is an ongoing debate on which measures provide a good proxy (WC08001); BV is the book value of equity (WC03501); M2B is the market value to the book value of equity (WC08001/WC03501); NI is the net income (WC01751); Sal is the sales (WC01001); SalG is the sales growth computed as ( − −1 )/ −1 ; TA is the total assets (WC02999); AWCA is the absolute value of the abnormal working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-year total assets calculated according to Marra et al. (2011) ; NOSH is the number of shares (NOSH); rVar is the return variance over the financial year computed as ( −11 / 0 ); Dispersion is the EPS forecasts standard deviation from IBES (STDEV); and AnFollow is the number of analysts following from IBES (NUMEST). a GBP billions. b Billions. Cuzick (1985) test is the non-parametric test for the trend across ordered groups. c Groups are defined as the percentage of disclosure quality of KPIs, where zero means the poorest quality and 100% means the best practice. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. (Easton, 2004) . We have used the same models' properties and the details used in their estimation as in Mazzi et al., (2014) . Refer to the informative appendices B & C in Mazzi et al., (2014) for a description of these details. a The Cuzick (1985) test is a non-parametric test for the trend across ordered groups. The *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Easton, 2004) . We have used the same models' properties and the details used in their estimation as in Mazzi et al., (2014) . Refer to the informative appendices B & C in Mazzi et al., (2014) for a description of these details. OvKPIs is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as compliance with the OFR (ASB, 2006) . See subsection 3.2 for a detailed description of the measure of KPI disclosure quality. FKPIs and NFinKPIs indicate the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs respectively. Suffix Rep means that KPI quality was measured throughout the whole annual report. Suffix Sec means that KPI quality was measured in the Business Review section only. Suffixes rank and norm mean that KPI quality was transformed using percentile ranking and normal scores respectively. For the calculation of these variables see subsection 3.2. MV is market value of equity (WC08001); BV is book value of equity (WC03501); M2B is the market value to book value of equity (WC08001/WC03501); NI is net income (WC01751); SalG is sales growth computed as ( − −1 )/ −1 (WC01001); AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by endof-the-year total assets, calculated according to Marra et al. (2011) ; rVar is the return variance over the financial year computed as ( −11 / 0 ); Dispersion is the EPS forecasts standard deviation from IBES (STDEV); and AnFollow is the number of analysts following from IBES (NUMEST). a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. The *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. refers to an average measure of the implied cost of equity capital, calculated as the mean of the following measures (c.f., Hail and Leuz, 2006) : (Claus and Thomas, 2001) , (Gebhardt et al., 2001) , (Gode and Mohanran, 2003) , (Easton, 2004) . We have used the same models' properties and the details used in their estimation as in Mazzi et al., (2014) . Refer to the informative appendices B & C in Mazzi et al., (2014) for a description of these details. OvKPIs is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as compliance with OFR best practice guidelines (ASB, 2006) . See subsection 3.2 for a detailed description of the measure of KPI disclosure quality. FKPIs and NFinKPIs indicate the quality of financial and non-financial KPIs respectively. Suffix Rep means that the KPI quality was measured throughout the whole annual report. Suffix Sec means that the KPI quality was measured in the Business Review section only. Suffixes rank and norm mean that the KPI quality was transformed using percentile ranking and normal scores respectively. For the calculation of these variables see subsection 3.2. M2B is the market value to book value of equity (WC08001/WC03501); SalG is sales growth computed as ( − −1 )/ −1 (WC01001); AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by end-of-the-year total assets, calculated according to Marra et al. (2011) ; rVar is the return variance over the financial year computed as ( −11 / 0 ); Dispersion is the EPS forecasts standard deviation from IBES (STDEV); and AnFollow is the number of analysts following from IBES (NUMEST). a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 1) the definition and its calculation method should be explained 2) its purpose should be explained 3) the source of underlying data should be disclosed and, where relevant, assumptions explained 4) quantification or commentary on future targets should be provided 5) where information from the financial statements has been adjusted for inclusion in the OFR, that fact should be highlighted and a reconciliation provided 6) where available, the corresponding amount for the financial year immediately preceding the current year should be disclosed 7) any changes to KPIs should be disclosed and the calculation method used compared to previous financial years, including significant changes in the underlying accounting policies adopted in the financial statements should be identified and explained.
Reflecting on the examples provided by the Reporting Statement (ASB, 2006: pp. 29-38) , we capture data related to item four as two different types of information (either quantitative or narrative discussion). This is why eight qualitative characteristics are listed in Table 5 .
